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Summary  findings
Developing countries became full-fledged participants in  stake in reducing agricultural protection and subsidies
multilateral trade negotiations only with the Uruguay  and prohibitinig agricultural taxes and export quotas.
Round, during which they succeeded in bringing  Of particular interest are agreernents covering services
agriculture into the GATTr'WTO, reaching agreement on  - including, for example, agreements on ~vays  to permit
phasing out the Multi-Fibre Arrangement within 10  the temporary immigration of construction  workers. It is
years, and beginning work on services, among other  important that labor standards not be used to stifle
things.  competition from labor-abundant developing countries
Their overriding interest in the new round is still to  - that any agreement about labor standards not raise the
ensure the healthy expansion of an open multilateral  costs of unskilled labor in countries whose comparative
trading system.  advantage lies in exported products that use unskilled
Developing countries should seek across-the-board  labor extensively - and that excessively high product
liberalization rather  than zero-for-zero reductions, which  standards not be imposed.
tend to favor the interests of industrial countries (which  Developing countries can increase their leverage
focus on sectors in which they have comparative  substantially by forming coalitions based on common
advantage) and diminish the support for further cuts.  interests in a wide range of areas (as the Cairns group did
Liberalization of agricultural trade provides important  in the Uruguay Round).
opportunities.  Developing countries have a considerable
This paper  - a product  of Trade., Development Research Group  - is part of a larger effort in the group  to identify
opportunities for developing countries in the WTO 2000 negotiations. Copies of the paper are available  free from the World
Bank, 1S  18 H Street NW, Washington, DC 20433. Please  contact Lili Tabada, room MC3-333, telephone 202-473-6896,
fax 202-522-11159,  Internet address Itabada (c1  worldbank.  org. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web
at  http://www.worldbank.org!html!dec/Pubiications/Workpapers/home.html.  The  author  may  be  contacted  at
akrueger-Cleland.stanford.edu.  May 1999. (33 pages)
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Anne 0.  KruegerTHE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND THE NEXT ROUND
OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS
Until  the  Uruguay  Round  of multilateral  trade  negotiations, the  developing  countries
were  generally  observers.  They benefited as "free  riders"  from  whatever reductions  in  trade
barriers were negotiated among the developed countries, while simultaneously they argued for,
and  to  some  degree  received,  special  and  differential  (S&D)  treatment,  both  through  the
Generalized  System of Preferences (GSP) and through the automaticity with which the balance
of  payments  exception  was  used  to  permit  them  to  continue  reliance  upon  quantitative
restrictions and other protectionist measures.
All  that  changed  with  the  Uruguay  Round.  By  that  time,  many  policy-makers  and
development economists had become convinced that the highly protectionist policies followed by
developing  countries in  the name of import  substitution were inimical to  sustained economic
growth, and that outer-oriented policies and integration with the international economy offered a
better hope  -for  rapid development. For the first  time, developing countries participated not  as
observers but as full-scale members of the GATT, and achieved some considerable successes.'
Not  only  was the  participation of some  key  countries in  the Cairns group  critical to  getting
agriculture into the Round, but the developing countries were able to bargain for the phasing out
of the Multifiber  Arrangement, which was the single most costly trade restriction against them.
See Raed  Safadi and  Sam Laird,  1996, "The  Uruguay  Round Agreements: Impact on  Developing Countries",
World Development,  Vol. 24, No. 7, Pp. 1223-1242 for a survey of the various estimates of the likely increases in
world trade due to the Uruguay Round and the effects of the round on developing countries.On balance,  developing  countries  gained  a  lot more out  of  the  Uruguay  Round  than  could
possibly have been anticipated in advance. 2
During the period when the Uruguay Round was being negotiated, and subsequently as
the WTO came into being and undertakings from the Round have been implemented, developing
countries  were  simultaneously  engaged  in  liberalizing  their  own  trade  regimes,  generally
unilaterally. As  they have done so, the  importance of the international  economy to them  has
increased  greatly. Not only has the share of trade in GDP risen markedly in many developing
countries, but overall development strategies are based on reliance on the international market.
As uniform incentives for exporting are set at reasonable levels, export growth depends crucially
on access to markets. A rapidly-growing and open international economy is in the interests of all
countries, but especially of those whose development prospects are now tied to the success of an
outer-oriented development strategy. 3
At the same time, threats are arising to the multilateral trading system, especially in the
form of proliferating  preferential trading  arrangements, but also  with increased resort  to  anti-
dumping measures and other forms of implicit protection not now covered under WTO rules.
Indeed, there is considerable risk that the trend toward an increasingly multilateral liberalized
international trading system of the past half century may be reversed. Many observers, including
the present writer, are calling for a start of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations, both to
2  See Dani Rodrik, "Developing Countries after the Uruguay Round", paper prepared for the Group of 24, Mimeo.
August  1994, Will Martin  and  L.  Alan  Winters,  editors, The Uruguay  Round  and  the  Developing Countries,
Cambridge University Press, 1996,  and T. N. Srinivasan, Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System,
Westview Press, 1998.  for comprehensive surveys and assessments of the achievements of the developing countries
in the Uruguay Round.
3  The rapid growth of the international economy was always important to developing countries, even under import
substitution.  Indeed,  it can  be  argued  that  the  rapid  growth  of  the  international  economy  enabled  developing
countries to pursue  import-substitution strategies for far longer, and with  far smaller  costs  in terms of  foregone
2tackle unfinished business (such as further removal of agricultural barriers, which is in any event
scheduled to be negotiated) and to maintain the momentum toward multilateral liberalization. 4
In this paper, the interests of the developing countries in a next round of multilateral trade
negotiations are considered. While, on the one hand, it is likely that the concerted opposition of
the developing countries to the new round would prevent it, it is not in their interest to do so. For,
a new round is arguably the best way to assure the continuation of the open multilateral trading
system and prevent a reversion to regional trading blocs. Such a continuation will enable a more
rapid  growth  rate  for  the  international  economy,  and,  as  such,  would  provide  the  best
environment in which all countries can achieve their domestic economic objectives.
A first section considers the interests of the developing countries and examines the issues
in  which  virtually  all  developing  countries  have  similar  interests.  A  second  section  then
exarnines those  questions which  are significant to major groups of developing  countries. The
third section then examines the various issues that may arise in future negotiations and attempts
to assess the developing countries'  interests in them.
1.  Interests of Developing Countries in the WTO and International Trading System
It  was probably  never true that the developing countries were a homogeneous group with
common interests in the international trading system. But, as the growth experiences of different
economic growth, than would have been possible had world trade grown significantly more slowly or had  market
access been severely restricted.
4 Some developing countries are encountering technical difficulties in implementing the necessary measures called
for by the Uruguay Round agreement. There  is some opposition to the start of a new round on the grounds that the
measures already  agreed to should be implemented. The difficulties with this view are: I) postponement of a new
round will enable a sectoral approach to issues within the WTO (see below) which is a trend that bodes poorly for
future multilateral  liberalization; 2)  failure to start a new round would enable preferential trading arrangements to
take  center  stage  even  more than  they  now  do,  with  consequent weakening  of  the  multilateral  system  if  not
accompanied  by  further  liberalization  on  a  multilateral  basis;  and  3)  in the  absence  of  a  new round,  small
developing countries are left to their own (very weak) bargaining positions whereas a new round would enable them
to cooperate and gain bargaining strength.
3countries have diverged, whatever commonality there was has diminished. Some, such as Korea
and  Singapore, have achieved relatively high per capita incomes and are major exporters of a
diversified set of reasonably sophisticated manufactures and net importers of a large number of
agricultural goods. Others, at an earlier stage of development such as China, are net exporters of
unskilled  labor-intensive  manufactures.  Some,  such  as the  Bahamas  and  Panama,  primarily
export  services.  Even  with  regard  to  agricultural  exporters, there  are significant  differences
between those whose comparative advantage lies in tropical agricultural commodities and those
whose interests lie in temperate agriculture.
Nonetheless, there are a number of common interests. First of all, the developing countries -
even the larger ones - are all relatively small contrasted with the large trading nations in Europe,
the United States, Canada, and Japan. For that reason, they have greater need for an international
system  of rules  than do larger countries whose bargaining  power vis-a-vis  other countries  is
sufficient so that they have an individual voice in international trade. If Japan and the United
States disagree over trade issues, each has some influence unilaterally on the other. If, however,
Japan and Malaysia, or the United States and Nicaragua, enter into a dispute, the situation is far
more one-sided. As such, the protection that a well-functioning international trading system can
offer is far more important to developing countries than it is to the larger developed countries.
Moreover, the fact that they are developing countries means that the stake in the healthy growth
of the international economy is large: not only do most developing countries have economies that
are small and therefore highly dependent on trade: they have comparative advantages in a much
smaller range of goods than do large, developed countries.
The  preferred  approach  for  those  developing  countries  encountering  difficulties  in  implementation  of  the
Uruguay Round would be to seek a new round, but to negotiate long phase-in times for any new agreements.
4These  considerations  immediately  suggest  that  developing  countries  have  a  common
strong  interest in  strengthening  the multilateral  trading system: the more rules  are made and
disputes settled at the multilateral level, the more likely it is that their interests will be protected.
Beyond  that  general interest  in the strength of the system and the growth of the international
economy (which does have significant implications for developing countries'  strategies - a topic
to which attention returns in Sect. 4), however, there are a number of other identifiable common
interests. These include:  1). protection against capricious antidumping  (AD) or countervailing
duty  (CVD) actions on the part of the developed countries; 2) insuring  that the undertakings
madLe  under the Uruguay Round, especially with respect to agriculture and the MFA, are carried
out; 3) thwarting efforts to  achieve protection against developing  countries'  exports via labor
standards  and/or  environmental  agreements;  4)  avoiding  a  sectoral  approach  to  trade
negotiations; and 5) reaching an agreement to receive credit for binding unilateral liberalization
efforts; 6) providing means for developing countries to defend their interests in WTO dispute
settlement mechanisms; and 7) supporting and strengthening the multilateral institutions and the
coherence amongst them. 5 In the remainder of this section, each of these is discussed in turn.
AD  and  CVD Actions.  Although  economic theory suggests  that  measures to  prevent
predatory pricing (i.e., pricing below marginal cost with an intent to drive out actual or potential
comrLpetitors  and secure a monopoly position in a market) can improve welfare, in fact many of
the AD and CVD measures taken by developed countries do not meet the criteria set forth in
5 It should be noted  that special  and differential  treatment  for developing  countries  is NOT  on the list of topics in the
developing  countries' self-interest.  Because  of their weak bargaining  position,  the value of special  and differential
treatment  to the developing  countries  has been small, and there is growing  recognition  that the value  of coherence
among them to seek  even mildly greater  concessions  on items  of interest  to large  groups of developing  countries  on
a multilateral basis is worth far more than further S&D concessions.  See Martin Wolf, "Differential  and More
Favorable  Treatment  of Developing  Countries  and the International  Trading  System"  , Pp. 647-668  in World Bank
Economic  Review,  Vol. 1,  No. 4, September  1987  for an excellent  analysis.
5theory. In many instances, the measures actually used to determine the applicability of AD or
CVD law bea- little or no relation to the theory. 6
For a variety of reasons, developing countries are especially vulnerable to misapplication of
AD and CVD rules. First of all, because their exports are often intensive in the use of unskilled
labor, they are often goods that trigger protectionist efforts in developed countries. And AD and
CVD  measures  are  often the  "protectionist's  weapon  of  choice".  Secondly, AD  and  CVD
findings  are  easier  to  achieve  in  industries  or for  goods  where  marginal  costs  constitute  a
significant fraction of price. To illustrate, in industries such as semiconductors,  marginal cost is
very small relative to fixed costs, so it is virtually impossible to find that goods were sold below
cost. 7 The result is that it is highly unlikely that there can be an AD or CVD finding against a
foreign semiconductor firm. By contrast, in industries in which many developing countries have
a comparative  advantage, current costs  are a much bigger percentage of total  costs. As  such,
developing countries are more vulnerable to AD and CVD actions. Thirdly,  defending against an
AD or CVD allegation is costly; when exports are smaller, the barrier to exporting posed by the
threat of AD or CVD is greater because these costs loom larger. Because developing  countries
tend to have smaller volumes and values of exports of individual manufactured items, the extent
to which fear of AD and CVD actions will deter potential exporters is greater in these countries.
Current WTO regulations governing AD and CVD  laws in member countries are currently
very  weak,  and  the  practices  engaged  in  by  the  U.S.,  Australia,  and  others  are  not  WTO-
6  See Anne 0.  Krueger,  Economic  Policies at Cross-Purposes,  Brookings Institution,  1995,  for an overview.  See
Robert Boltuck and Robert Litan, Down in the Dumps, Brookings,  1991  for a critical assessment of U. S. AD
administration  and practices.
7 Efforts have, of course,  been made to surmount  this difficulty.  The United States  automatically  adds an 8 percent
"profit margin" to its calculated  costs in other countries, as well as using average, instead of marginal, cost
estimates. It also finds dumping whenever it is shown that the price charged to U.S. consumers is below that
charged  in the home country  or in third markets.
6inconsistent.  There are a number of possible ways of strengthening the provisions surrounding
the administration  of AD and CVD rules in individual countries that could significantly reduce
their impact.
Implementing  Uruguay  Round  Agreements.  As  already  mentioned,  the  developing
countries  were  effective  in  achieving several important  victories  during  the  Uruguay Round
negotiations. Among these were the agreement to phase out the MFA and the decision to bring
agriculture into the WTO.'  The MFA phase-out is important quantitatively, and it is end-loaded.
Developing countries recognize, correctly, that it is vital that the UR undertakings be carried out,
and it is clearly in their interest to insist upon it. Any bargaining strategy that is developed should
be structured in such a way as to insure that the unwinding of the MFA and other undertakings
already agreed to in fact take place. It is likewise important that Working Groups on issues such
as agriculture bring recommendations that will enable further progress to be made in liberalizing
agricultural trade.
Avoidance of Embodied  Protection in Labor  Standards or Environmental Regulations.
Perhaps the issue that should be of greatest concern to developing countries is the push currently
under way in some developed countries to achieve labor or environmental standards enforcable
through the WTO. Some standards, endorsed by the ILO, have already been embedded in WTO -
i.e., the injunction against the use of prison labor. And, when there is universal agreement among
countries that  certain practices are abhorrent, an international agreement through the ILO  can
surely be reached.
8  As I shall argue below, I believe that bringing services under WTO discipline, especially if it can be combined
witth  agreements permitting the temporary residence of foreign workers in connection with service provision (i.e. in
construction projects) is also potentially highly valuable.
7Questions arise, however, regarding both the standards to be included and the linking of
those standards to trade issues. The question of standards is perhaps more important in the case
of labor issues, while the linkages are probably more questionable in the case of environmental
concerns.
Turning first to labor standards, most developing countries' growth prospects depend in part
on  their  ability  to  adopt  appropriate  trade  policies  (abandoning  earlier  import-substitution
stances) and rely on export growth as one of the pillars of sustained economic growth. 9
In turn, for most of those developing countries, much of the growth of exports will likely
take  place  among  goods  which  use  unskilled  labor  relatively  intensively.  After  all,  most
developing countries'  factor endowments are characterized by a relative abundance of unskilled
labor and a relative scarcity of skilled labor and capital.
Many well-meaning individuals,  appalled at low wages and poor working conditions in
low-income countries, push for labor standards. Their concern is humanitarian and may ignore
the underlying realities that better wages and working conditions for some can come only at the
expense  of  worse  wages  and  working  conditions  (including  unemployment  and  low  farm
incomes) for others. However, union representatives and producer/employers in industries that
use  relatively  large  amounts  of  unskilled  labor  in  developed  countries  also  advocate  "labor
standards", and do so in part because they are seeking protection against foreign competition.
To insist upon wages and working conditions that are above those that can result in full
employment  in  developing  countries  is  to  deny,  or choke  off,  a  significant portion  of  their
9  An  outer oriented trade  strategy  of course  is not  effective unless  accompanied  by  a  number of  other policy
measures. including adequate attention to infrastructure, an appropriate domestic commercial code,  a flexible labor
market policy, and a stable macroeconomic environment.
8comparative  advantage. And there are few developing countries where concerns are expressed
about shortages of unskilled labor.
But the fact that the "labor standards" issue appeals to such humanitarian interests as well
as to those in unskilled labor-intensive industries in de'. eloped countries makes the risk of labor
standards  greater than it would be if only those seeking their own self-interest were involved.
There are two risks: a first is that labor standards may be introduced in such a way that developed
countries can impose protection against imports from developing countries;'" the second is that
reasonable  innocuous standards will initially  be set, but that over the years,  labor unions  and
others will succeed in having these standards elevated until they finally achieve the protectionist
content that impairs developing countries'  comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries.
While  it  is  tempting  to  say  that  the  fight  should  only  be  over  labor  standards  that
immediately impair developing countries'  legitimate sources of comparative advantage, it is all
too easy to  strengthen labor standards once they are accepted as a part of the WTO. Certainly,
developing  countries  should be  alert to the danger that, once any standards  are accepted, the
barriers against using them for protectionist purposes are greatly weakened."'
Environmental  standards  raise  some  other  issues.  First  of  all,  when  the  only
environmental  damage  is  borne  by  residents  of  a  country,  there  is  no  obvious  case  for
'° The practical  problems associated with implementing labor standards are formidable. A key question is whether
trade sanctions  should be permitted  only when the  exporting firn  is found  guilty of failing to meet standards  in
producing the good for export, when the firm is guilty of violating standards in any of its operations,  or would the
issue arise  whenever  anyone  in the  country  was  violating standards?  The  latter would  involve  the  developed
countries  to  impose  trade  penalties  whenever  there  were  any  instances of  violation of  standards in  developed
countries. The middle, while more restricted,  would still entail oversight of activities not entering into international
trade.  The last would, however, involve accounting issues every bit as complex as those that arise in determining
whether exporters have violated anti-dumping or countervailing duty provisions.
l There is already precedent for this. The labor standards code associated with the Mexican accession to NAFTA is
relatively  innocuous.  It  is  being  attacked  in the  U.S.  as  being  much  to  weak-, and  there  are  pressure  groups
attempting to strengthen it. Meanwhile, however, groups interested in achieving labor standards within the  WTO are
arguing that NAFTA set a good example.
9international  standards  of  any  kind  to  be  applied.  When there  are "spillovers",  the  question
becomes on of allocating "pollution"  rights among countries. Most economists agree that, when
there is a serious case for restriction of particular pollutants, such as cfc's,  on a global basis the
appropriate policy response is to alloeate pollution "rights" or permits, and then to permit trade
in those permits.
The key issue for reaching accords is the basis on which permits will be allocated. On one
hand, developed countries generally are currently generating a large fraction of the pollutants; if
rights were allocated in proportion to existing pollution rates, developed countries would receive
most of the permits. On the other hand, if rapid growth for developing countries is in prospect for
the next several decades, it is clear that their share of the increase in pollutants would be very
large in the absence of environmental restraints. Moreover, environmental restraints would entail
some brake on growth rates that would otherwise be attainable. For these reasons, developing
countries  tend  to  advocate  the  allocation  of  pollution  permits,  or  rights,  in  proportion  to
population,  while  developed countries  advocate allocation  on the basis  of  existing shares  in
pollutant-generation.
The  disagreement  is  fundamental,  and  until  it  is  resolved,  it  is  difficult  to  expect
significant progress.'2 The risks resulting from  failure to reach environmental accords are that
environmentalists  in developed countries will lend their support to protectionist measures. To the
extent that developing countries could end up losing even more through the consequent increase
in protection against their exports than they would through a less-than-ideal environmental deal,
12 A first-best solution  is to have taxes and subsidies  that reflect the externalities  of various activities  imposed on
those undertaking them, combined with free trade. Since it is seldom, if ever, that trade itself generates the
externality, the appropriate policy measure is to impose the tax on  the activity that generates  the exernality,
presumably production in most cases. See Jagdish Bhagwati  and T. N. Srinivasan,  "Trade and the Environment:
10there is some case to be made for being willing to negotiate agreements that are less close to the
proportionate-to-population  allocation than would, from their viewpoint, be ideal since, as a by-
product, protectionist measures against  them would be somewhat reduced.
Supporting Cross-Sectoral Negotiations.  The success of  the GATT, and the tremendous
expansion of world trade, was made possible in significant part because of the gains achieved
through multilateral negotiations for reduction of trade barriers. While economic theory tells us,
correctly, thalt countries that liberalize their trade unilaterally will gain, political theory tells us
that resistance to trade liberalization in import competing sectors will not be offset unless there
are groups of identifiable gainers. While those gainers exist even under unilateral liberalization,
it is often not evident to those parties who they are. With multilateral trade negotiations, many
exporting  interests  correctly recognized  their  potential gains  from  trade liberalization.  Many
analysts attribute the success of the GATT with trade liberalization to the tying together of export
interests with  evident  interest  in trade  liberalization  in  other countries  to  trade  liberalization
domestically.
In recent years, developed countries have begun to negotiate sector-by-sector agreements
on issues such as telecoms and information technology. There are several difficulties with this
approach: 1) once those sectors are liberalized, producers in those areas have a reduced incentive
to support import liberalization in protected sectors; and 2) developed countries are selecting the
sectors for negotiation in which they believe (probably correctly in most instances) that they have
a comparative advantage. The sectors of interest to most developing countries will be much more
difficult to negotiate on a sector-by-sector basis because they are largely import competing, and
Does Environmental  Diversity Detract from the Case for Free Trade? in J. Bhagwati and Robert Hudec, editors, Fair
Trade and Harmonization: Prerequisites for Free Trade? MIT Press, Cambridge. Pp. 159-224.
11the political economy of trade liberalization is such that political resistance will be strong unless
offset by exporting interests in developed countries." 3
Credit for Unilateral Liberalization.  As already mentioned, many developing  countries
have  been  unilaterally  reducing  their  levels  of  protection.  Because  it  has  been  outside  of
multilateral  tariff  negotiations,  and  because  in  many  instances  tariffs have  not  been  bound,
developing countries have received no "credit" for these liberalizations in the negotiating rounds.
In part, this has been because countries that have liberalized their regimes have nonetheless been
reluctant  to  bind  their  tariff  levels  and  hence  lose  the  right  to  restore  protection  should
circumstances arise that induce them to do so. From the viewpoint of the major trading countries,
credit cannot be given in this circumstance because of  the possibility of revocation.  A strong
case  can be  made  that  developing  countries  should bind  tariff reductions  in  their  own  self-
interest. It is an effective means of liberalization: refusal to bind casts doubt as to the intentions
of  policy makers to maintain trade liberalization.
Nonetheless,  it  should  be  possible  to  find  means  to  negotiate  for  some  credit  for
liberalization even if tariffs are not bound, provided that provision could be made for reciprocal
"snapback"  on the part of developed countries were tariffs later restored to their former levels.
Because most of the prospective unilateral liberalization in the world is in developing countries,
and because improved market access is greatly in their interest, this is an area where negotiations
should be possible and to the benefit of the group as a whole.
It may be objected that developing countries have a strong interest in further agricultural liberalization, and that
negotiations are  in any  event scheduled on a sectoral basis. However, the decision on a new round  will be taken
before those  negotiations  begin. Hence, developing  countries do not need to "choose" between  a new round  and
sectoral negotiations; they can strongly support a new round, and nonetheless enter into negotiations with respect to
agriculture should there be no decision for a new round. The difficulty with this is, of course, that there is likely to
be significantly  less agricultural sector liberalization than there would be if the negotiations took place as part of an
overall multilateral trade negotiation.
12Techmical Support for Dispute Settlement Mechanisms.  It is noted in many places that
most  developing  countries,  partly  because  they  are  small  and  partly  because  of  lack  of
experience, are finding it difficult to cope with the WTO's  new dispute settlement mechanisms.
Richard Blackhurst'4 (1997, P. 530) points out that two-thirds of the least developed countries in
the WTO have no representation. For the other third, there is typically only one person covering
all the international organizations there. Given the active participation of members in the work of
the  WTO, this  inevitably  leads to  underrepresentation of  their interests and  their inability to
participate and have any influence on WTO decisions. An enlargement of the WTO secretariat to
permit the establishment of a service which would provide legal advice on procedures and other
aspects of dispute settlement would benefit not only developing countries, but also some of the
smaller  developed  countries.  The cost of such a service would  be relatively  small, and  it is
difficult to see why there should be objections to it.
Increasing  Coherence  among  Multilateral  Institutions.  In  the  Ministerial  meeting  in
Marrakech  to  give  formal  approval  to  the  Uruguay  Round,  ministers  called  for  "greater
coherence" between the International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank, and the WTO. In this,
there was clear recognition of the linkages between global trade and monetary policies and the
ability of developing countries to achieve rapid economic growth on a sustainable basis.
The need for greater coherence has been apparent at least since the debt crisis of the 1980s,
when  simple  arithmetic showed that heavily  indebted  developing  countries could not  service
their debt and resume growth (a monetary issue) unless their exports grew at a sufficiently rapid
rate. That rate was well above the rate of growth of world GDP; as such, it was clear that should
14  Richard  Blackhurst,  1997.  "The WTO  and the Global  Economy",  Pp. 527-544  in World  Economy.  Vol. 20, No. 5,
August.
13protectionist  measures in developed  countries increase, efforts of the World Bank and IMF to
support the necessary measures in developing countries would in any event be destined to failure.
The same is still true. Healthy growth of world trade cannot continue unless the underlying
functioning  of  the international  monetary  system and  of international capital  flows is  sound.
Likewise, healthy evolution of the international financial system, and of  the flow of capital from
countries with lower real rates of return to those with higher real rates of return cannot  persist
without an open multilateral trading system.
It is clearly in the interest of all countries, developed and developing, to attempt to achieve
greater  coherence,  although  the  obstacles  to  any  formal  arrangements  are  large.  But  for
developing  countries, the importance  of achieving  greater coherence is  even greater than for
developed countries: the G-7 have other forums through which they can consider linkages and
policy alternatives. To the extent that means cannot be found of achieve these results through the
IMF,  World Bank,  and  WTO,  the  interests of the  developing  countries will be  less  directly
represented.  Moreover,  spokesmen  for the  World  Bank  and  IMF  are  generally much  more
cognizant of the situation of developing countries, and their interests, than are the ministers who
meet at the G-7.
2.  Areas of Interest to Significant Groups of Developing Countries
For the issues listed  below,  some developing  countries have strong interests. In some
instances, it may be possible to link issues in such a way that developing countries as a group are
able to present a solid  front. In many instances, however, it will be more likely that countries
may  find  alignments  with  those  other  developing  countries  with  similar  interests  and  with
developed countries.
14Tropical and Temperate Agriculture.  As  already mentioned,  bringing agriculture under
WTO  disciplines at all was a significant achievement. Not only were any further increases in
subsidies  and agricultural  protection among  the developed  countries ruled out, but  there  was
some  (relatively  minor)  rollback  (with  a  commitment to  a 20  percent  reduction in  the  total
(distorting) support provided by government to agriculture and a cutback in export subsidies) and
the commitment to shift to tariffication of protection was highly significant. But much remains to
be done.
In terms of their immediate interests, the developing countries can be divided into three
groups.  On one hand,  there are exporters of tropical products.  Second, there are exporters of
temperate products, often foodgrains. Third, there are importers of basic foodstuffs, again often
foodgrains.  Sometimes,  there  are overlaps  between  groups.  For  example, some  SubSaharan
African  countries  export tropical  agricultural comnodities  but  import foodgrains. And  a few
exporters  of  temperate  agricultural  commodities  are  net  importers  of  tropical  agricultural
prodiucts.  In fact, the interests of developing countries simplify somewhat more than this division
would suggest. For there is little protection accorded to tropical agricultural commodities.' 5 The
key difference in interests among those developing countries with  interests in agricultural trade
lies between those who are net importers of foodgrains and those who are net exporters. In some
instances, even those differences are smaller than they appear:  some of the African foodgrain
importers have in fact severely discriminated against their agriculture: removal of discrimination
could well restore them to their earlier exporter status.
15'  There are, to be  sure, exceptions.  One prominent exception was bananas, but that has already been adjudicated
under WTO. Phytosanitary regulations are of interest to exporters of tropical agricultural commodities, as well.
15Even for foodgrain  importers,  there is an interest in attempting  to assure that agricultural
liberalization  occurs simultaneously  across  North America,  East Asia, and Europe: if it does so,
the world price of foodgrains  will be significantly  more stable than should liberalization  occur,
e.g. at one time in Japan and Korea, and another time in Europe. For foodgrain  exporters,  the
same holds true, although the primary interest in simultaneous  liberalization,  with removal of
export subsidies and reduction  in domestic supports  in countries  that should be importing  more
(such as Europe and East Asia) is in the stability  of foodgrain  prices.
Another tranche of agricultural  negotiations  is set to start in 1999,  one year  before the end
of  the  six-year  implementation period for the  Uruguay Round. Presumably, preliminary
preparations  are underway in many national governments.  Almost all countries  have an interest
in negotiating  a prohibition  against export subsidies.' 6 Likewise,  there is a strong  interest on the
part of developing  countries  exporting  agricultural  commodities  to devise  rules to prohibit  export
taxes and quotas." Even for developing countries  that do subsidize  their agricultural  exports,
there are almost certainly better uses for the money  elsewhere, and it is likely that the benefits
accruing  to LDC exporters  because  DC subsidies  have stopped  will outweigh  the costs associated
with losses of domestic subsidies.
Another area of interest to developing  countries  that are agricultural  exporters  concerns
import access rights. Until the Uruguay Round, there was no provision for access. Under the
Uruguay  Round, all countries  were immediately  obliged  to insure up to 5 percent market access
for imports. Increasing minimum access under tariff-quotas, and setting a ceiling on  the
maximum  rate of tariff or tariff equivalent would  be in the interest of most exporting  countries.
6 The exceptions  are the countries  that are net grain importers,  who therefore  benefit  from low prices  for imported
(subsidized)  grain.
16cowutries would by itself lead to rising world prices of some agricultural commodities.
As  already mentioned, all developing countries that export any agricultural commodities
have an interest in assuring that phytosanitary regulations are based on scientific evidence. As
such,  developing countries have a strong interest in participating in discussions of experience
under the Uruguay Round to insure that changes in regulations enable the improved functioning
of ihe system  and do not  permit the manipulation of phytosanitary standards for protectionist
ends. In general, PSP regulations that have been negotiated call for mutual recognition, which is
strongly in the interests of developing countries. If there are difficulties, they probably lie in the
willingness  of  developed  countries to  send delegations to  attest to  the  testing procedures in
developing countries.
In recent years, a number  of countries have been interested in protecting the claims of
geographic  origin of particular commodities. This was especially true of wine, where the French
achieved a special agreement with respect to wine naming and labeling in the Uruguay Round.
The issue has arisen in several cases with regard to developing countries: a prominent example is
basmati rice which has been mentioned as the name of a special rice that should be labeled only
if originating in South Asia. While there are a few agricultural commodities where the rights to
claiming names and geographic origin may be of interest to developing countries, in general the
developing  countries'  interests lie on the other side of the issue. Rights to particular names and
geographic origin designations are generally restrictive and tend to increase the difficulty of entry
into a market. As developing countries are  generally potential late entrants into markets, efforts
to restrict  the use of particular  names is generally not in their interest, and  is an  issue which
developing countries should  negotiate with care.
7 Export taxes are used to maintain high domestic prices, and thus high domestic production.
17Under  the  Uruguay  Round,  the  Cairns  group  of  agricultural  exporters  managed  to
maintain  solidarity  among themselves  despite the differences between tropical  and temperate
agricultural  exporters.  That  example  should  demonstrate  yet  again  the  wisdom  of  seeking
broader packages of liberalization rather than insisting on trying to retain vestiges of protection.
Reducing Tariffs. It is sometimes said that the GATT was so successful that remaining
tariff barriers are of negligible importance. And, for many commodities, especially in developed
countries, the statement is generally true. There are, however, still "peaks"  in tariff schedules
even in  developed  countries.  These peaks  will  become  even more important  as tariffication
proceeds under the Uruguay Round agreement for agriculture, textiles, and apparel. Many of the
items for which  tariffs are (or, with tariffication, will become) important are items of special
interest  to  developing  countries.  There  will  be  ample  scope  for  negotiating  for removal  or
reduction of these tariffs.
For many  of these  items, however,  there  are a few  developing  countries whose policy
makers perceive it to be in their interests that restrictions and/or tariffs remain in place. This is
certainly true, for example, for some of the larger holders of quotas under the MFA: there may be
significant resistance to pushes for multilateral tariff reductions from developing countries that
have  recently lost  their MFA  quotas and have sizable production  capacity. While there  is  as
strong case that countries such as Korea have an interest in phasing out their textiles and apparel
production,  opposition in the past has significantly reduced the effectiveness of those lobbying
for dissolution of the MFA. There is a danger that this could happen again with tariffs on these
items. An obvious solution would be for negotiation among those perceiving themselves to be
potential losers with lower tariffs on textiles and apparel, such as Korea, and other developing
18countries with tariffs on imports of goods in which the advanced developing countries appear to
have a strong comparative advantage.
Services Liberalization: Construction . It seems evident that some developing countries
could develop significant economic activity in exporting construction services if it were possible
to bring workers temporarily into the country where construction is to be undertaken." 8 Turkish
construction firms have been able to export construction services to neighboring countries, for
example.
A major  barrier to expansion of these activities is the lack of a WTO-based agreement
under which construction firms could temporarily bring their workers into countries while work
was undertaken.  Liberalization  of construction,  like other services, is in  the best interests  of
almost all countries, but some developing countries such as Turkey and India have perhaps even
larger than average interest.
It  is highly unlikely  that  significant liberalization  of construction  services will  occur if
efforts to negotiate  it are made at a sectoral level. Rather, this  is an area where cross-sectoral
bargaining  could  achieve  significant  results.  Countries with  potential  or  actual  comparative
advantage  in  these  services might be  well  advised to  consider  giving concessions  on  other
services or issues of interest to developed countries in return for expanded access to construction
activities in other countries.
Services  Liberalization: Financial  Services. Although  it is  likely that  companies  from
developed countries  have a comparative advantage in most  financial services in the short run,
Is  This already happened in several instances.  Perhaps  the best known  is the case of Korea,  where  after the oil price
increase  of 1973  a large number of contracts  with Middle  Eastern  oil exporting countries  enabled Korean firms to
bring in workers and materials,  live temporarily  in the area where  construction  was underway,  and to depart once
work  was completed.
19there  is increasing  evidence that  access to  financial services at world prices is greatly in  the
interests  of  developing  countries.  The  presence  of  well-developed  and  competitively-priced
financial services is increasingly important to the ability of individual firms to export. High-cost
or inefficient financial services can be equivalent to a tax on exports or, in some cases, an export
prohibition  because of the inability of exporters to compete with those in other countries with
access to those services.
Moreover, the presence of competition in financial services is healthy for domestic finns:
there is evidence that, just  as for industrial goods, financial services are highest-cost and most
inefficient in countries where the domestic market has been most sheltered. Developing countries
have a strong interest in an efficient international market in financial services. While it may be
possible  to  support further  liberalization  of services  "in  exchange"  for  developed  countries'
concessions  on items of particular  interest to developing countries, it should be borne in mind
that  financial service liberalization is in the interests of developing countries themselves.
Other Services Liberalization. In general, services are of increasing importance in world
trade. Developing countries have a strong interest in access to competitively-priced a high quality
services in support of their domestic producers, especially as they attempt to enter into, and move
upscale, in export markets. As such, support of services liberalization is generally warranted.
Some services, however, are of more interest than others. Services in support of tourism,
for example,  are  of  great importance,  as  tourism  is  already a  flourishing  industry  in  many
developing  countries  and  has  great  growth  potential  as  amenities  (such  as  easy
telecommunications,  access to financial services, and travel) increase in attractiveness, both in
quality and in price.
20For another group of developing countries, liberalization of maritime services is of greater
than average interest, both because an increasingly competitive world maritime industry would
lower costs for developing countries (and especially those with smaller volumes of trade or with
greater distance to markets) and because some developing countries either have, or may be able
to cLevelop,  a comparative advantage in maritime shipping.
As industrialized countries seek greater liberalization in some of the services industries of
greatest interest to them, developing countries would be well advised to insist on linking services
negotiations across sectors and to insure that the sectors of greatest interest to them are included
in the negotiations.
Multilateral Investment Code.  As many developing countries are hoping to attract foreign
capital,  and  especially  foreign  direct  investment,  to  accelerate  their  development  process,
insuring a low-cost supply of foreign capital is greatly in their interest. Unfortunately, the initial
effort to achieve a multilateral investment code was undertaken at the OECD, rather than through
the WTO, which left the developing countries outside of the initiative.
Since the OECD effort appears to have failed, there is a new opportunity for multilateral
negotiations,  including the developing countries, to achieve such a code. A code that provides
greater assurance to investors of their rights would increase the supply of capital at lower cost
than  would  otherwise  be  possible.  It  is  in  developing  countries'  interests  to  support  the
development of such a code. However, it is probably more in the interests of the middle-income
and more advanced developing countries than it is of many of the low-income countries that do
not appear to be attracting much foreign capital.
Special Status of Least Developed Countries. As is well known, during the first forty years
of  the  GATT,  the  developing  countries  insisted  upon  "special  and  differential"  (S  &  D)
21treatment  within the GATT. The view was that the developing countries were "too  weak"  to
compete and therefore needed special exemption from GATT rules.
With the benefit  of hindsight, it seems clear that this  approach was greatly flawed. The
desirability  of  GATT/WTO  discipline  increases with  the urgency  of the  need for  economic
growth and rising living standards.
Exemption from GATT disciplines permitted exactly the sorts of inefficiencies that poor
countries could ill afford, and the same argument can be made  today for the least  developed
countries. Since many of these countries have not as yet undertaken sufficient policy reform to
enable  rapid  growth,  many  of them have  few export goods,  and  most  of those  are primary
commodities, the tariffs and duties on which in other countries are already very low.
Clearly, more rapid growth of the open multilateral trading  system will benefit the least-
developed  countries.  However,  questions  arise  as  to  their  interest  in  future  multilateral
negotiations.  The answer must surely be that provision should be made for these countries to
enable  them  to  maintain  full  membership  in  the  WTO,  in  anticipation  of  future  economic
development. To that end, the least developing countries can and perhaps should ask for longer
transition times for the implementation of agreements on issues such as competition policy, the
phasing  out  of protection,  and  other matters  which  require  legal  or complex  administrative
action.
3.  Bargaining Issues
On many of the issues discussed in Sect.2,  groups of developing countries may find it
more useful to  align themselves  with developed countries of similar interests (as in the Cairns
Group), rather than  attempting to maintain  a coalition among themselves.  On the other hand,
there  are a  number  of  issues  on  which  there  is  a  fairly  clear  and  common interest  among
22developing  countries (and some developed countries), or at least some large group of developing
countries, and where bargaining as a group may enhance the outcome for all.
Some of these, such as resistance to restrictive labor standards, are of major importance for
future  access  to  markets and  the open  multilateral trading  system; others,  such as  credit for
unilateral  liberalization,  and  technical  support  for  dispute  settlement  procedures,  are  of  far
smaller  import,  but could, for that reason,  be much easier to  attain. A cohesive stand among
developing  countries on these issues could, however, make a significant difference not only to
their  status  within  the WTO  in future years,  but also  to  the health of the  entire multilateral
trading system." 9
Competition Policy and Standards.  As the sensitivity of producers to events in other parts
of the  world  increases, pressures for  competition policy  and standards are  likely to  increase.
While these are closely related, it is important to distinguish between them.  Competition policy,
insofar  as  it genuinely  seeks to  prevent  predatory pricing  and monopolization  of markets, is
clearly  in  the  interests of developing  countries, as discussed  below regarding  AD  and  CVD
measures. Indeed, many economists supporting the open multilateral system  are supportive of
competition policy through the WTO precisely because it is seen as a substitute for AD and CVD
measures.
For a variety of reasons, there does not appear much prospect of significant advances with
respect  to  competition  policy  in  the  near  future. There  are  significant  differences  between
countries in their approach to domestic law, and there does not appear to be sufficient agreement
19  One of the controversial aspects of the Uruguay Round was the agreement on protection of intellectual property
rights under TRIPs. New proposals  from the industrial countries would require evaluation;  at this stage, however,
industrial and developing countries alike seem to be digesting the Uruguay Round agreements, and, to this author's
knowledge, no further proposals have been made.
23as to the nature of a desirable global regime to expect much progress in the near future. 20 Should
momentum  for competition  policy increase,  it would be in developing  countries'  interests to
support it.
The case with regard to standards is more complex. On one hand, strengthening provisions
in  the  WTO  that  preclude  health  and  safety measures  except  when there  is  a  demonstrated
scientific basis is clearly in the interests of developing countries. On the other hand, efforts to set
standards (such as with high-definition television) are often a measure used by existing firms to
prevent competition from new sources. 2'
Standards: Labor and the Environment. For reasons outlined above, developing countries
have a strong interest in resisting the imposition of labor standards and environmental standards
through  the WTO.  In the case of labor standards,  it is appropriate to note the strong linkage
between productivity and real wages and to resist the imposition of standards that have the effect
of raising  labor costs in poor  countries, simply because that removes part of those countries'
comparative advantage.
An appropriate stance for environmental concerns is somewhat more difficult. The success
of  the  GATT/WTO  in  reducing  trade  barriers  came  about  because  countries  "exchanged"
concessions. The same sort of regime can apply for environmental issues, but only when those
issues  are negotiated as  an  "exchange"  across countries. Developing  countries have a  strong
interest in preventing developed countries from perceiving that they will not negotiate regarding
the environment at all; such a stand could induce environmentalists to push even harder for trade-
20  On  this,  see  F.  M.  Scherer,  1994.  Competition  Policies  for  an  Integrated  World,  Brookings  Institution,
Washington. D. C.
21  See  Alan  0.  Sykes,  1994, Product  Standards  for  Internationally  Integrated  Goods  Markets  for  an  analysis.
Brookings Institution, Washington, D. C.
24enforced environmental measures. Insistence that these measures be undertaken through mutual
agreement,  however,  is  strongly  in  their  interest.  Thus,  an  evident  willingness  to  discuss
environmental issues in other forums, and efforts to persuade developed countries'  leaders that
bases  other  than  existing  shares of  environmental  degradation, would  be  well-advised. The
danger  of  a  stance  perceived  to  be  negative is  that  developed countries,  pressured by  their
environmental  lobbies, would then react in frustration, using the trade instrument as a lever to
attempt to achieve environmental ends. The fact that protectionist interests are willing to use the
environment as an excuse to achieve their ends only makes the matter more dangerous.
Restraining  Administered  Protection.  For  the  same  reasons  as  avoiding  labor  and
environmental  standards is of particular interest to developing countries, so is it in their interest
to  support  measures  that  would  contain  the  spread  of  AD  and  CVD  measures  and  usage.
Developing countries are especially likely to be targets of AD and CVD measures just when they
are  emerging  as  successful  exporters, in part  because it is  always  more difficult to  increase
market  share  than to  maintain  it. And AD  and  CVD measures have been used  with greatest
frequency against the entrants into new markets: Japan and Korea have been much more frequent
targets for the United States than has Europe, for example.
Little  progress  was  made  in  the  Uruguay  Round  in  restraining  anti-dumping  and
countervailing  duty measures.  Transparency requirements were increased, and a 5-year sunset
clause was introduced, but, as has been argued by Finger and others, these provisions have little
impact as AD findings can be undertaken again, and AD continues to be domestic law, which
producers view as an "entitlement". 22
'  J. Michael Finger, 1996.  "Legalized Backsliding: Safeguarding Provisions in the GATT',  in Will Martin and Alan
Winteres, eds., The Uruguay Round and the Developing  Countries, Cambridge University Press, pp. 316-40.
25There  are  a  number  of  provisions  which  could  restrain  the  use  of  AD  and  CVD.
Increasing the "de minimus" requirement before findings of dumping or subsidization are found
would reduce the frequency of filings. So, too, would measures  to restrict the ways in which
"pricing below cost"  was calculated. Indeed, if ways could be found to change AD and  CVD
provisions  to  reflect  the  original  intent  - that  is,  to  penalize  efforts  to  monopolize  markets
through pricing below marginal cost - the protective impact of AD and CVD measures could be
restrained significantly.
It  is doubtful  whether developing  countries have enough bargaining  power (and  place
insulation against AD and CVD high enough on their list of priorities) to lead any moves toward
a  strengthened multilateral  AD and  CVD regime.  Should some  developing countries take the
initiative  and  seek  to  strengthen  the  regime,  however,  it  would  be  greatly  to  developing
countries' interests to join and support  the effort.
Credit for Unilateral Liberalization. Developing countries have, on average, significantly
higher tariffs (and in some cases, tariff-equivalents of quotas) than most of the major developed
countries.  And  many are  finding it strongly  in their  self-interest to liberalize unilaterally  as
already seen. Their  liberalization is clearly in their own interest, but  until now, they have not
received "credit" in  multilateral trade negotiating rounds.
The  largest trading  countries have been unanimous in  pointing out  that credit  can be
received only when tariffs are bound. And many developing countries, while liberalizing, have
been unwilling to bind their new, lower, tariff levels. 23
23 See Rodrik, op. cit., for an estimate  of the extent to which developing  countries  have bound  their tariffs at their
existing  levels.
26One clear possibility is for developing countries to agree to bind their tariffs (or a very
significant majority of their tariffs) at their reduced levels, in exchange for credit for some of the
issues discussed above that are significantly in developing countries' interests. 24
Avoiding  Sectoral  Approaches.  The developed  countries  can  liberalize the sectors  of
greatest interest to them when a sector-by-sector approach is used in multilateral negotiations. As
already seen, the telecoms agreement, under which telecoms equipment of the type in which the
U.S., Europe,  and  Japan appear to have strong comparative advantages was liberalized, is an
exarnple of  such  a  sectoral  approach.  While  it is  greatly  in  the  world's  interest,  including
especially  the  developing  countries,  to  have  that  sector  liberalized,  those  exporters  of
telecommunications  equipment  who  would  otherwise  have  strongly  supported  multilateral
liberalization  of  import-competing  industries  in  their  own  countries  in  return  for  that
liberalization will now naturally be politically significantly less active. As such, part of the anti-
protectionist support that could have been mustered for reduction of protection in the exporting
countries has been lost.
While  it  is probably  in  the  interests  of  the developed  countries  themselves  to  eschew
sectoral negotiations, the fact that they can take the initiative, and select sectors where they are
exporters,  makes  the  interests  of  the  developing  countries  in  this  issue  particularly  strong.
Serious consideration could be given to refusal to negotiate except on an across-the-board basis.
Preferential Trading Arrangements.  As already mentioned, many developing countries are
already members  of one or more preferential trading arrangements (PTAs), while others are left
out. At first sight, it would appear that this would give rise to significant differences in interests
24 Indeed,  developing  countries  could bargain  for significant  gains if they were willing to agree  to eschew  frequent
resort to the balance of payments clause of the GATT articles.  In return, there would have to  be a  clear
27among developing countries. And, to a degree, it does. Mexico, for example, would undoubtedly
stand to lose  some of the benefits of preferential  access to the U.  S. market  it now enjoys if
Mercosur countries were to enter into a free trade agreement with the U.S.
On the other hand, it is unlikely that developing country members of preferential trading
arrangements can block the entry of new members should the major developed countries - the
U.S.,  Japan,  and the European  Union - decide upon enlargement. For that reason, there  is a
significant interest, even among developing countries already in a PTA, for attempting to  find
rules governing formation of PTAs that are more consistent with the open multilateral trading
system. 25
There are a number of reasons for concern with PTAs. On one hand, there is an issue as to
the compatibility of  PTAs with future strengthening of the multilateral trading system. On the
other hand,  there  are concerns that  PTAs  could be  "stumbling  blocks",  and protectionist  in
nature. 26
For a variety of reasons, there appears to be little support among developed countries at the
present  time  for strengthening  Article  XXIV.  One  area  where  it may  be  possible  to  make
progress  is with regard to the types of rules of origin (ROOs) that are permitted  under FTAs.
Because  they can be itemized,  ROOs can be  formnulated  in  ways that  discriminate  against
suppliers from third countries. Indeed, much of the fear of protectionism arising from FTAs is
based on concern about ROOs.  In the NAFTA, for example, the ROO for textiles and apparel is
understanding  as to the (presumably,  more  restrictive)  circumstances  when  the clause  could be invoked.
25 Possible rules might be: 1)  only customs unions are permitted; 2) each free trade agreements must specify a single
common  percentage value added as the  only acceptable rule of  origin for all commodity categories; 3) each PTA
must contain  a clause spelling out the terms on which new members who meet them will automatically gain entry;
or 4) PTAs may only be formed when the lowest preexisting tariff for any member of the group becomes the tariff
that prevails in the FTA.
28"triple transformation",  implying that all the materials used in producing the goods are made in
North  America.  By contrast, the ROO for automobiles is a  50 percent North American  value
added. In other cases, ROOs are based on the material inputs used.
Were ROOs required to be uniform, concerns about discriminatory aspects of FTAs against
third  countries  would  be  significantly  reduced.  The simplest  possible  rule  governing  ROOs
would be one which specified that they must be specified across all import categories at a single
specified percentage value added within the PTA. It would then not be possible for a country to
have  one  ROO  for  automobiles,  another  for  textiles  and  apparel,  and  still  others  for  other
products.  Since many of the concerns about PTAs are based on fears for developing countries
whose trading partners are sufficiently widely dispersed that a PTA with any group of them does
not solve the problem, a requirement that all ROOs be based on a value added criterion, and that
the value added be the same across all activities, would greatly reduce protectionist potential and
thus be in the interest of most developing countries.
It is doubtful whether developing countries could, by themselves, lead an initiative to achieve
significant change. Nonetheless, it would be much in their interest to support such an initiative
should it arise during the course of negotiations.
Technical  Support for  Dispute  Settlement  Procedures.  As  the WTO  dispute settlement
mechanism has been strengthened, procedures have become even more important than they were
under  the  GATT. As  already  mentioned,  many of the  smaller and  lower-income  developing
countries lack of the legal knowledge and experience necessary to defend their interests in WTO
disputes.  Hiring  foreign  legal  assistance  does  not  substitute,  when  only  representatives  of
26  See T.N.Srinivasan,  Developing Countries and the Multilateral Trading System, MIT Press, 1998, Chapter 7, for
an elaboration of the argument.
29governments  are permnitted  to be  in the panel hearing. And, while some  of the larger trading
countries probably have sufficient competence  in their own governments to  be able to  handle
disputes before the WTO,  there is little conflict of interest between them and other developing
countries: disputes are likely to be predominantly between developed and developing countries.
While  it might be advisable for the smaller and lower-income developing countries  to
seek to  have the ruling changed so that private attorneys for the plaintiff or defendant might
appear in the courtroom, an alternative would be to seek to have a unit established which could
provide support and advice for small developing countries that become involved in the dispute
settlement mechanism. Such a unit could advise on procedures, representation, and other issues
associated with  defending against AD  and CVD charges and with  initiating  cases when  it is
believed that foreigners have violated WTO rules. It might be self-standing, or affiliated with the
WTO, UNCTAD, or another international organization.
Such  a  unit  could  be  provided  at relatively  low  cost,  and  as  such  should  not  be  a
centerpiece of the bargaining process. Nonetheless, its value to some developing countries would
be great enough  so that, at an appropriate point in the negotiations,  the developing  countries
should probably seek it.
Achieving  Greater  Coherence.  While  greater  influence  of  the  World  Bank  and
International Monetary Fund on activities at WTO would strengthen the role of the developing
countries, there are major institutional difficulties in the way of achieving greater coherence. To
date, there has been a scarcity of proposals  setting forth concrete mechanisms by which greater
coherence  could  be  achieved.  Indeed,  a  realistic  assessment  of  the  prospects  and  built-in
difficulties suggests that it may not be feasible to achieve significantly greater coherence between
the three organizations.
30Nonetheless,  should workable proposals for greater coherence be forthcoming, it would
behoove  developing  countries to  support them. Multilateral organizations in general  serve as
something of a bulwark against the undue influence of the large and powerful countries in world
affairs.  While  they cannot  go against the  realities of  the large countries'  interests, they  can
nonetheless offset part of their influence, if only by insuring that the interests of smaller countries
are at least recognized.
4,  Procedural Issues
The above discussion has a number of implications for procedures relating to a new round.
First, and probably most important, the developing countries have a strong interest in across-the-
board,  and not  zero-for-zero  single issue, negotiations. The ability of developed  countries to
define the agenda and to support negotiations only for sectors in which they believe they have a
comparative  advantage (such as infornation  technology) makes the likelihood that developed
couantries' protection against  imports from developing  countries will be reduced considerably
smaller.
Likewise, the developing countries would be well advised to be willing to consider a range of
new  issues,  but  to  insist  upon  two  preconditions:  1) that  movement  of  natural  persons  (in
construction,  etc.)  be  actively  negotiated  and  2)  that  the  Uruguay  Round  agreement
implementation (especially of the MFA phaseout) be fully carried out.
While  the  developing  countries  could,  as  a  group,  achieve  a  considerable  amount  of
bargaining  strength, their interests are sufficiently divergent that it is more likely that they can
join  and should support the formation of coalitions on issues of concern to them. The Cairns
group  was remarkably  successful  despite representing  the  divergent interests  of  tropical and
temperate  agriculture. To the extent that those with different interests are willing to align, the
31developing  countries  will  be  able  to  achieve  more  in  any  future  round.  But  the  practical
difficulties  of bringing too many issues into a  coalition probably imply that  it is  desirable to
identify key groups of issues (agriculture, financial services, construction services, etc.) and to
join in several groups.
5.  Conclusions
It is impossible, at this juncture, to anticipate how the agenda for the next round of trade
negotiations  will  evolve. Insofar  as  developing  countries can influence that  agenda, keeping
negotiations  cross-sectoral,  avoiding  labor  and  environmental  standards  within  the  GATT,
insuring that the undertakings made in the Uruguay Round (especially with respect to the MFA
and  agriculture)  are carried  out,  and measures that  reduce protection  in  developed countries
should surely be at the top of the agenda for developing countries.
Since it is in the developing countries'  interest that there be a strong and effective WTO
underpinning the open multilateral trading system, it will clearly be in the interests of developing
countries to support a new round, and to  seek outcomes which offer prospects for accelerated
growth of international trade and their access to each others'  and developed countries' markets.
Constructive  participation  in the preparation of the  agenda and  in  the negotiations will have
much greater prospects of success than will refusals to negotiate. In that regard, it is important
that developing countries not only indicate their lack of desire to have labor and environmental
standards tied to trade issues, but signal their willingness to address environmental issues in other
forums.
When the agenda for a new round is drawn up, developing countries could gain significantly
if issues such as temporary migration in connection with construction services, reduction of tariff
peaks,  financial  services  liberalization,  restrictions  on  the use  of  AD  and  CVD  measures,
32liberalization  of other services of particular  interest to  developing  countries, and  agricultural
trade  liberalization  can be  addressed  to  permit  expanded  access for  developing  countries to
developed countries'  markets.  In addition, insofar as technical support for dispute settlement or
credit  for  unilateral  liberalization  can be  achieved, that will  represent  a  gain for  developing
countries.
Overall, however, developing country strategy should be to insure further multilateral trade
liberalization, with a readiness to support measures such as an investment code which may not be
of high priority to them if it helps assure success of the round. In instances where developing
countries'  immediate interests are limited  (as may be the case with  some services), it may be
possible to win concessions on items of interest, mentioned above, in return for support of those
measures. In other instances, where developing  countries'  interests are stronger (such as with
insuring that preferential  trading arrangements are consistent with the multilateral system) but
where they cannot by themselves successfully initiate measures, the strategy must surely be one
of  "watchful waiting", with a readiness to support meaningful proposals originating from other
countries.
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